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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY WEAVER, d.b.a. REALEX REALTY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LA\-JRENCE R. HODULA and 
LA.JA G. l10DULA, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
P RELHUNARY STATEHENT 
Case No. 14597 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared 
in the trial court in this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to obtain his 
conunission for the sale of defendants' home and for 
attorney's fees. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's 
cause of action and held for defendants on their 
counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgrrent 
against him, and judgment in his favor. 
STATEHENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Jerry Weaver, a realtor, and 
the defendants, Mr. and Hrs. Lawrence R. Nodula, 
entered into a sales agency contract, Exhibit III, 
in April of 1974 for the sale of defendants' home 
located in Syraccse, Utah, and the de fen dan ts agreed 
to pay pla:c-- cc c_ ,-. ~ales commission. 
The plaintiff found a buyer, 11r. and /lrs. Trc1cy 
Stevens. Thereafter, three earnest money agreements, 
Exhibits X, XI, and II, were signed by the buyer <1ncl 
defendants which finally led to the si,JninCJ of a I<c.Jl 
Esta.te Contract, Exhibit I, consummating the ,;ale· on 
August 27, 1974. The contract provided for l'"''r•rc·nt 
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of $1,951.95 cash, $440.00 a month payments until 
the principal and interest were paid in full, and 
the buyer agreed to obtain a loan as soon as pes-
sib le. 
Because defendants needed $1,900.00 cash to 
enable them to move into a condominium, the plaintiff 
delayed receiving part of his conunission to a later 
time to help the defendants. 
Following the sale, buyer continued to try to 
refinance the home to cash out defendants' equity. 
Efforts to arrange financing stalled during September, 
October and t~ovember because the economy experienced 
a recession, hitting a low point around September of 
1974. Home loans became hard to obtain. 
On December 11, 1974, the defendants and buyer 
signed an agreerrent of accord and sa tis faction whereby 
they agreed to rescind their contract. Plaintiff brought 
suit to recover his commission on December 11, 1974, and 
the defendants cow1terclaimed. 
Plalntiff believes that his commission was earned 
and due as of the signlng of the real estate contract on 
,\uyust 27, 1974. Defendants disagree. 
3 
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The District Court found that the plaintiff 
failed to perform the written agreement between the 
parties, the plaintiff breached his fiduciary relation-
ship with the defendants and failed to make full dis-
closure to defendants of all pertinent facts concerning 
the loan, and dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action. 
The District Court also found that the defendants con-
tributed $286.00 toward the plaintiff's commission plus 
$190.00 for a title policy, and that the defendants were 
entitled to attorney's fees of $500.00 on the basis of 
fairness and equity. 
ARGU11ENT 
POUlT I 
THE PLAINTIFF DID FULFILL HIS OBLIGATION BY 
PROVIDhJG A PURCHASER WHO \vAS ABLE TO HAKE 
THE $440. ~0 A NO,~TH PAYHENTS A.l'<D WHO WAS 
;JUALif~E~ :'') OBTAHl A LOAN, A.l'JD HE PERFOR!1ED 
TOTALLY THE \-JRITTE!~ AGREEt!Ei~T BET\vEEi~ THE 
PARTIES. 
A real estate broker has an obligation to pro-
duce a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to 
purchase the property at the seller's terms, and to 
do so without any dishonesty, fraud, or misrepre-
sentation which would leave the seller vulnerable 
to a loss of his bargain. See F.f.l.A. Financial 
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Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 
670 (1965). 
The terms agreed to by the seller were first 
included in the sales agency contract, Exhibit III. 
It states: 
During the life of this contract, if you 
find a party who is ready, able and willing 
to buy, lease or exchange said property or 
any part thereof, at said price and terms, 
or any other price or terms, to which I may 
agree in writing, or if said property or any 
part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged 
during said term by myself or any other 
party, I agree to pay a commission of 6% 
of such sale, ... 
"I" refers to the property owner, the defen-
dants, in the above agreement, and "you" refers to 
the plaintiff. 
The price and terms to which the defendants 
agreed in writing were set forth in the Uniform Real 
Estate contract, Exhibit I, signed on August 27, 
1974, which was the last written agreement signed by 
the defendants. It states: 
3. Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into 
possession and pay for said described 
premises the sum of $38,900.00 payable at 
the office of seller, his assigns or order 
at Security Title Company, Farmington, Utah, 
strictly within the following times, to wit: 
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$1,951.95 cash, the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, and the balance of 
$36,948.05 shall be paid as follows: The 
sum of $440.00 or more, on or before the 
1st day of October, A.D. 1974, and the sum 
of $440.00 or more, on or before the 1st 
day of each succeeding month thereafter 
until interest and principal are paid in 
full. Said payment includes interest, 
principal, taxes and fire insurance pre-
mi urns, with the taxes and fire insurance 
premium to be paid by the seller at the due 
date of each and added on to the then con-
tract balance. Buyers hereby agree to 
obtain a conventional loan of not to exceed 
10% per annum, as soon as possible. Seller 
hereby agrees to assume and pay all expenses 
necessary and incident in obtaining said 
loan. (emphasis added) 
The listing agreement required the plaintiff to 
find a ready, willing and able buyer according to the 
terms specified by the defendants in writing. The last 
agreement signed by defendants stated that $440.00 v1ould 
be paid each month until the balance was paid off, and 
that a loan would t•J obtained by the buyer as soon as 
possible. The contract did not state a time before 
which a loan had to be obtained. The District Court 
found that $440.00 a month was an exceptionally hi0h 
payment which acted as an incentive for the bu:;cr to 
obtain the loan. The plaintiff also test.ified thcl'c 1f 
the buyer could not obtain financing, 'chen the dc>fL·n-
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dants were willing to continue receiving the large 
monthly payments at the reflected rate of interest. 
The Utah Supreme Court has helped clarify 
the burden that a real estate broker has to carry 
out in order to be entitled to his commission in 
F.rl.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra. 
In that case, defendant, Build, Inc., listed an apart-
ment house with Cook Realty Company, agreeing to pay 
a 5% commission. Defendant entered into an earnest 
money and exchange agreement to sell the apartment 
house, and executed a promissory note and a mortgage 
on a duplex as security on the note. Thereafter, Cook 
assigned the note to the plaintiff, payment on the 
note was stopped by defendant after four payments, and 
plaintiff brought suit. As a defense, defendant as-
serted that within sixty days after the sale of the 
apartment house the buyers became dissatisfied with 
the transaction, abandoned the property, and brought 
suit to rescind the purchase contract. The defendant 
alleged that it was a result of certain misrepresent-
ations mCJ.de about the property by Cook Realty. It 
appcCJ.ring to the court that there was no actionable 
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misrepresentation by Cook Realty, the Supreme Court 
held that a real estate broker has an obligation to 
produce a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to 
purchase property according to the terms of the seller, 
and to do so without any dishonesty, fraud, or mis-
representation. Once this is done, the court held, a 
broker cannot be held to be an insurer against the 
possibility that the purchaser may become dissatisfied 
and sue to rescind. 
In the case at hand, plaintiff produced a buyer 
who was ready, willing and able to purchase according 
to the terms of the defendants. On the basis of a 
$17,000 a year salary, the buyer was able to make the 
$440.00 a month payments which is not disputed, and the 
buyer was qualified to obtain a loan as the District 
Court found. 
On November 8, 1974, 74 days after the sale was 
consummated, the defendants notified the buyers that 
they had until December 15, 1974, to obtain a loan to 
pay off the defendants' equity, because the defendants 
had become concerned about the condition of their home, 
as evidenced by their at_torney's le'cter, L::-:hibit V, 
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dated November 8, 19 74, which stated: 
I am also going to advise Realex Realty 
of our position, because my clients are 
not going to allow their horne to be 
wasted by your failure to keep the prop-
erty up and then have the value of the 
horne depreciated. 
Since the buyer was not able to obtain financ-
ing due to the then existing money situation, the 
defendants and buyer subsequently agreed to rescind 
the contract on December 11, 1974. 
Since the broker cannot be held to be an in-
surer against the possibility that the buyer will 
becorne dissatisfied and sue to rescind, as held in 
the F.I1.A. Financial case, the plaintiff cannot be 
an insurer against the possibility that both the 
buyer and seller will become dissatisfied and agree 
to rescind because of unforeseeable circumstances, 
as they have done in the case at hand. 
Therefore, the plaintiff performed his part 
of the written agreement by obtaining a purchaser 
who was ready, willing and able to purchase according 
to the written terms of the defendant, and should be 
entitled to his commission as long as there was no 
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dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation involved. 
POINT II 
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO CONTRADICT, 
ADD TO, VARY OR SUBTRACT FROM THE TERHS OF A 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT, Ai.W THE S UPRE11E COURT 
SHOULD DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY OF WITdESSES 
SEEKING TO VARY THE TERMS OF AN OTHERI'IISE 
UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT, EVEN IN THE ABSE"CE 
OF OBJECTION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
Stated in general terms, parol evidence may not 
be given to change the terms of a written agreement 
which is clear, definite and unambiguous. This rule 
has been adopted and consistently affirmed in this 
state. See Strout General Realty Agency, Inc. v. 
Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (1974); Rainford v. Rytting, 
2 2 Utah 2 d 2 52 , 2 5 l P . 2 d 7 6 9 ( 19 6 9 ) . 
The case at ~and involves the admission of 
parol or extri~sic ~~~dnnce without objection to show 
that the written agreement entered into by the p~rties 
in April and on the 27th of August did not accurately 
reflect the agreement of tf.e parties. 
Defendants admit reading and si<Jl1ing the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract which provides, ~s stated 
under Point I above. Nevertheless, they contend that 
the plaintiff and defendants discussed or~lly that tl1c 
10 
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buyer was to receive his loan before the plaintiff 
was entitled to his corrunission. Defendants also 
testified, on page 13 of the transcript, that they 
were assured orally that the loan would go through 
within thirtY days in a conversation at the tirre 
of signing the real estate contract on August 27, 
1974. The plaintiff testified on page 60, that he 
could make no such guarantee and that it could take 
up to six months for the loan to go through, and that 
the defendants understood this. 
The District Court found that the listlng agree-
rrent called for a dmm payment equivalent to the 
defendants' equity, and that the plaintiff in obtain-
ing the earnest money agreement and presumably the 
real estate contract, did so on the basis that the 
buyer would obtain immediate financing. 
The point is that the written agreement did 
not state what the defendants' testimony indicated 
and what the court found. The terms were clear. 
Plaintiff would find a ready, willing and able buyer 
CJt the terms CJgrced in writing. The real estate 
contract provided that the buyer would pay $440.00 
11 
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a month and that the financing would be obtained 
as soon as possible. The contract did not state 
that a loan had to be obtained within thirty days 
for the deal to be final, or that the defendants 
had to get their equity before the plaintiff was 
entitled to his commission. 
The courts have been unanimous in applying 
the parol evidence rule strictly to those documents 
in which the parties have made a distinct and com-
plete writing of their agreement. In such a case 
the authorities are agreed that, in the event of 
misunderstanding, the documents shall be taken as 
conclusive evidence of their intention. 3 Jones 
on Evidence, §16:1 (6th Ed., page 72). 
The parol evidence rule prevents other words 
from being added to or subtracted from those which 
the parties ha·~·•' dc<u::-erately set down in writing. 
The courts are not at liberty to speculate as to the 
subjective intention of the parties, they are charged 
with the duty of ascertaining the meaning of the 
written language. They cannot give effect to any in-
tention which is not expressed by the language of the 
12 
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instrurrent. In other words, if the intent and rreaning 
may be ascertained in the language of the writing, it 
must be construed to mean what it says, and other evi-
dence may not be received to give it new meaning. 
3 Jones on Evidence, §16:18 (6th Ed., pages 120 
through 121). 
The Supreme Court was called upon to construe 
a written contract between a plaintiff broker and a 
defendant seller in Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc., 
v. Broderick, supra. That case was an appeal from a 
judgrrent against the plaintiff in an action to recover 
a real estate broker's commission after the defendant 
sold his own house. The defendant persuaded the trial 
court that the defendant agreed orally to pay the com-
mission only in the event that the plaintiff, broker, 
sold the home, in spite of the written agreement that 
stated that the defendant agreed to pay the commission 
if a ready, willing and able buyer was procured by the 
plaintiff or anybody else, including the defendant. 
The Surreme Court reversed the trial court and held 
that the trial court erred in permitting oral testi-
rnuny to vary the disputed paragraph and in finding 
13 
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that the agreement as signed was not the agreement 
of the parties. The court stated that under the 
general rule, parol evidence may not be given to 
change the term of a written agreement which is clear, 
definite and unambiguous. Then the court explained 
that the policy behind this rule is the following: 
.•. To permit that would to cast doubt upon 
the integrity of all contracts and leave 
the party to a solemn agreement at the 
mercy of the uncertainties of oral testi-
mony given by one who in the subsequent 
light of events discovers that he made 
a bad bargain. 
~ .. Without that rule there would be no assur-
ance of the enforceability of a written 
contract. If such assurance were removed 
today from our law, general disaster would 
result, because of the consequent destruc-
tion of confidence, for the tremendous but 
closely adjusted machinery of modern busi-
ness cannot function at all without confi-
dence in t~e enforceability of contracts .... ' 
In the case a~ bar, the listing agreement 
stated that the pla1ntiff was to be paid his commission 
if the plaintiff finds a buyer, ready, willing and 
able to purchase at the terms agreed in writing. The 
real estate contract stated that $440.00 would be paid 
each month, until interest and principal arc paid 111 
full, and that buyer would obtain a loan as soon as 
14 
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possible. By the defendants' oral testimony, they per-
suaded the District Court that the listing agreement 
called for the defendants to receive their equity 
before the 6% commission was earned by plaintiff, 
and that $440.00 would be paid for one or two months, 
and that the buyers would obtain financing immediately, 
if not sooner, within thirty days, and that if financ-
ing could not be obtained immediately that the contract 
was void. The parol evidence clearly changes the mean-
ing and intention of the unambiguous written agreement. 
As was stated previously, parol evidence was 
permitted without objection from plai~tiff's attorney. 
It is a general rule that an appellate court will con-
sider only such questions as were raised in the lower 
court. However, the rule of waiver by failing to 
raise the objection in the trial court to parol evi-
dence objectionable under the parol evidence rule is 
not one which has been universally accepted. Some 
courts have taken the position that if the terms 
of the written contract are free from ambiguity, 
the rights of the parties are to be determined and 
controlled thereby, without any effect being given 
15 
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to testimony which would vary or contradict such 
terms, even though the testimony is admitted with-
out objection. 92 A.L.R. at 819. 
Plaintiff was not able to find any Utah cases 
on this point, but many states in our region have 
so held. In Folger v. Purkiser, 127 Cal.App. 554, 
16 P.2d 305 (1932), the court held that although 
evidence was admitted without objection, of an oral 
agreement that the purchase price should be paid 
at a certain time, the appellate court must determine 
the time of performance without regard to the evidence 
of such oral agreement. It was stated that the parol 
evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but is one of 
substantive law, and that the parties have not waived 
their right to urge the point on appeal that the evi-
dence should :_e d~o;regarded. 
In an action by plaintiff for a real estate com-
mission, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Ruff v. Boltz, 
448 P.2d 549, 252 Or. 2d 236 (1968), reversed the lower 
court decision which ruled in favor of the defendant on 
the basis of oral testimony. The court held: 
16 
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The parol evidence rule is the the rule of sub-
st.anti ve law and will be applied whether or 
not objection is made to the admission of 
the evidence which violates t.he rule. 
The rule in Ut.ah should be t.he sarre, because 
t.he parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law 
and parol evidence should be disregarded, even with-
out. objection in t.he trial court. Therefore, the 
court. should disregard the parol evidence heard in 
t.he trial court, since it varies an already unambigu-
ous contract. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FINDING AND 
CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED 
HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO DEFENDANTS BY 
FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT THERE WAS NO 
LON< HONEY AVAILABLE TO PURCHASER. 
<£nerally in actions by and against brokers t.he 
burden of proof is cast upon the party who asserts t.he 
affirmative of an issue raised by the pleading. 12 
~~.Jur.2d §248, page 989. 
Thus, in Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Utah 549, 
155 P. 432 (1916), the Ut.ah Suprerre Court held that 
one employing a broker to find a purchaser of land 
has 'che burden of proving that. false representations 
17 
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were made by the broker as to the financial ability 
of the prospective purchaser. Hartineau involved 
an action by the plaintiff, broker, against the de-
fendant, seller, to recover judgment on a promissory 
note made by the defendant to plaintiff for a $1,750.00 
commission. The defendant raised the affirmative 
defense that false representations were made concern-
ing the financial ability of the purchaser for the 
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to enter into the 
contract of sale and for the purpose of obtaining 
the commission evidenced by the note. The court stated: 
It seems to us that, in view that the 
law preswnes solvency and never presumes 
fraud or deceit, and in view that if a 
principal relies upon the defense of 
having been deceived by the broker with 
regard to the purchaser's financial ability 
to pay, he must allege the facts in that 
regard in his ;>~eading, there fore he should 
also be re:Fll ,.~c} 1:0 assume the burden of 
proof to establLsh the facts thus pleaded. 
To that effect, as we read the decisions, 
is the weight of authority. We are of the 
opinion, therefore, that the burden of proof 
rested upon the defendant to prove the 
financial inability of Mr. Earl to pay, as 
well as to prove the fraud or bad faith 
charged against plaintiff. 
Thus, the defendants herein had the burden 
of proving that plaintiff failed to disclose material 
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in formation to the defendants before they signed 
the real estate contract dated August 27, 1974. 
This defendants did not do. 
The only evidence presented to the District 
Court concerning the plaintiff's knowledge at the 
tirre of signing the August 27, 19 74, contract was, 
first, the testimony of Paula Sorenson, the loan 
officer from Zions First National Bank. She testi-
fied on page 88 of the transcript that the buyer, 
Mr. Stevens, was qualified for a loan, but when he 
applied for a loan in July or August of 1974 there 
were no conventional loan money available through 
her bank. However, she testified that she couldn't 
say what the situation was at other loan institu-
tions. 
On page 96 of the transcript, in answer to 
a question by counsel on whether there were signs 
of money being available for the Stevens' loan in 
light of the situation in Zions First National Bank 
whc re there absolutely was no money available, plain-
tiff testified as follows: 
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Q: Mr. Weaver, even though there was no money 
available for the Stevens' loan in 
August, were there other institutions 
that gave you indication that there may 
be funds available? 
A: Yes, there certainly was. This was the 
only lender that said, you know, "we are 
not making any loans". But other lenders 
were. In fact, I wouldn't have been con-
tinuing to go to other places and taking 
my time and Mr. Stevens' time and Mr. 
Modula's, if I hadn't have thought there 
was some hope of obtaining a loan. 
On page 65 of the transcript, plaintiff testi-
fied that he had taken the buyer to eight or ten 
different loan institutions and made applications 
at several of them. He said that they would make 
application and were led to believe that the insti-
tutions believed that they were going to be able to 
make the loan, and then would later turn it down. 
All this n==~rred after the August 27, 1974, 
sale was consummated. 
The only evidence that the defendants presented 
the court was their testimony on page 94 of the trans-
cript, which was that plaintiff had never told them 
that no money was available. This is true, because the 
plaintiff did not know that there was no monel' a val 1 ,1blc. 
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The summary of all of this testimony would 
indicate that the defendants were not aware that 
money was not available at the time the August 27, 
1974, contract was signed. The extent of the plain-
tiff's knowledge was that some loan institutions 
were not making loans, and that is far short of 
knowledge that no money was available. This evidence 
does not satisfy the defendants' burden of proving 
that plaintiff withheld material information. 
Furthermore, the defendants acknowledged that 
they were aware of the difficulty with loans at the 
time of signing the second and third earnest money 
agreements on August 10 and 17, 1974, on page 32 of 
the transcript. 
It follows that they were also aware of the 
problem at the time of the signing of the real estate 
contract dated August 27, 1974. They were aware of 
what information the plaintiff had obtained1 that 
there was difficulty in getting a loan. That is why 
the terms of the contract stated that the loan would 
be obtained as soon as possible instead of within a 
definite period of time, and why large monthly pay-
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ments of $440.00 would be made. 
The defendants did not carry their burden 
of proving that material information concerning the 
buyer's loan was withheld according to the evidence. 
Therefore, the plaintiff did not breach his fiduciary 
duty. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANTS. 
The District Court awarded the defendants 
$500.00 attorney's fees, stating that because the 
plaintiff had insisted on attorney's fees under 
the signed listing agreement, fairness and equity 
required the provision to work -both ways. This was 
improper. The rule is well established that at tor-
ney' s ::ees s'-.:::Juld not be awarded in the abscn ce of 
stat.utL ~r a j~0e:-··ten t between the parties. 
In the sa(es agency contract signed by the 
defendants, the fifth clause states: 
In case of the employment of an attorney to 
enforce any of the terms of this agreL>mcnt, 
I agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee 
and all costs of collection. 
As stated previously, the lilllguage in thL> 
listing agreement makes it clear that ttw rJVJnvr of 
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the property, the defendants, are giving the plain-
tiff authorization to take certain action necessary 
to sell the home. Therefore, the "I" in the above 
clause refers to the property owner, or defendants. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Hawkins v. Perry, 
123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953), held that in the 
absence of statute or agreement between the parties, 
a litigant cannot be awarded attorney's fees. In that 
case, plaintiff gave money to his uncle to be used in 
purchasing a house, with the understanding that title 
would be taken in the uncle's name until plaintiff 
became of age, at which time it would be turned over 
to the plaintiff. Plaintiff had to file suit to re-
cover the property and was awarded attorney's fees by 
the trial court, but the Supreme Court reversed, based 
on the holding above. 
In the case at hand, there was a writ ten agree-
ment by the parties, but the terms of the ag:eement 
limited the awarding of attorney's fees to the plain-
tiff. 
In Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 
77 (1969), this court stated that the plaintiff's 
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rights to attorney's fees must be found, if at all, 
in the terms of the contract. That case involved 
a suit to enforce the written contract to purchase 
cookware for $279.00 and for attorney's fees. The 
lower court awarded the plaintiff nominal damages 
and $75.00 attorney's fees. The Supreme Court re-
versed the awarding of attorney's fees because the 
provision in the contract stated that in the case 
of repossession of merchandise, attorney's fees and 
court costs would be paid. The Supreme Court held 
that because there was no delivery of the merchandise, 
there could be no repossession, and hence the terms 
of the contract had no application. 
Likewise, in the case at hand the contract 
limited payment of attornej's fees to plaintiff by 
the owner, and the plaintiff made no promise at all 
to pay attorney's fees. 
The trial court based it~ awarding of attor-
ney's fees on equity and fairness. This has no 
support in the cases, and in fact the Utah cases 
suggest quite the contrary. 
In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 
P.2d 989 (1958), this court stated that people shuuld 
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be able to contract on their own terms without in-
dulgence of paternalism by courts in alleviation 
of one side or another from effects of a bad con-
tract. That case involved a suit by a purchaser 
under a real estate contract for money paid to de-
fendant sellers which the purchaser breached. The 
court stated that it is only where it turns out 
that one side or the other is to be penalized by 
en forcerrent of a contract so unconscionable that 
no fair-minded person would view the result without 
profound sense of injustice that equity will step 
in. The court held that where the sales price was 
$22,000.00 and the plaintiff had paid $6,680.00, it 
was not unconscionable for a defendant to keep the 
full $6,680.00 as liquidated damaged under the for-
te1ture provision of the contract. 
In our case, only the defendants promised to 
pay attorney's fees if it became necessary to collect 
plaintiff's commission. The plaintiff did not pro-
nuse to pay attorney's fees in the event he lost the 
suit to collect his commission, or if the defendants 
brought suit. Once the terms are agreed upon, it 
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should not be rewritten as the District Court has 
done to relieve a partY from its burden unless it 
is so unjust and so unconscionable as to provoke 
a profound sense of injustice. Under no circum-
stances do the cases suggest that the contract should 
be rewritten to impose a burden on a party. 
Plaintiff's suit is not a frivolous claim 
nor one brought to harass the defendants. It is 
a reasonable, forthright claim for a commission on 
a sale involving a great deal of tirre and effort. 
The defendants' agreement and promise to pay attor-
ney's fees falls far short from being unjust and 
unconscionable so as to allow equity to step in and 
rewrite the contract. The parties should be free 
to include whatever ~rovisions they feel necessary 
for their own ;-"-,~'~,:, -:'c_lon 1 and after two parties have 
agreed and signed a wri t'cen agreement the court 
should not be allowed to step in and impose a burden 
on a party as the District Court has done. 
Therefore 1 there being no promise by the pL:lin-
tiff to pay attorney's fees nor any statute \vh 1ch 
would allow it, the plaintiff should be relievccd from 
paying the defendants' attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's obligation should be considered 
fulfilled because he found a ready, willing and able 
buyer according to the written terms of the defendants. 
Parol evidence admitted by the District Court without 
objection should be disregarded, since it adds to and 
changes the meaning of an already unambiguous and com-
p le te writ ten con tract. 
The defendants failed to carry their burden of 
proving that the plaintiff withheld pertinent inforrrr 
ation concerning the buyers obtaining a loan and, 
there fore, there was no breach of a fiduciary duty. 
Attorney's fees are not awardable in the absence 
of a statute or agreement, and equity should not rewrite 
an agreement to place a burden on the plaintiff under 
the facts of this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of July, 
19 76. 
STAt\lLEY M. SMEDLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jerry Weaver 
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